## IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

In re Application of : Customer Number: 46320

John HIND, et al. : Confirmation Number: 5066

Application No.: 10/643,601 : Group Art Unit: 2454

Filed: August 18, 2003 : Examiner: J. Joo

For: BYPASSING CONTENT BLOCKING

## REPLY BRIEF

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents Commissioner For Patents P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir

This Reply Brief is submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 in response to the EXAMINER'S ANSWER dated March 16, 2010.

The Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments submitted in the Appeal Brief of December 21, 2009, raises additional issues and underscores the factual and legal shortcomings in the Examiner's rejection. In response, Appellants rely upon the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief of December 21, 2009, and the arguments set forth below.

REMARKS

Appellants have compared the statement of the rejection found on pages 3-14 of the Examiner's Answer with the statement of the rejection found on pages 3-13 of the Fifth Office Action. Upon making this comparison, Appellants have been unable to discover any substantial differences between the respective statements of the rejection. As such, Appellants proceed on the basis that the Examiner's sole response to Appellants' Appeal Brief is found on pages 14-19 of the Examiner's Answer in the section entitled "Response to Argument."

In the paragraph spanning pages 14 and 15 and in the first full paragraph on page 15 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner presented the following analysis:

claims. According to the claims' language, the content blocking logic is connected to the browser. By connection, the content blocking logic may be separate from the browser. Examiner points to Appellants' specification that also describes that the content blocking may reside external to the browser. Appellants' specification recties "As the content blocking logic 180, whether it resides in same computer as browser 130 or external 130" (Page 12, paragraph 0026), and figure I shows "Content Blocking Logic 180" external to browser 130. It is unclear as to how the content blocking logic or content blocking is "within" the browser as argued by the Appellants. Furthermore, according to the claims' language, while the browser is within a client device, the claims' do not specify that the content blocking logic is also within the client device. The content blocking logic is just connected to the browser and the browser is within the client device.

In response, Examiner respectfully disagrees with Appellants' interpretation of the

At the outset, Appellants note that the Examiner's analysis fails to recognize the differences between the teachings of the applied prior art and the claimed invention. The claimed invention (either as a method, a hardware system, or a machine readable storage) resides in a computer device (i.e., a computer hardware markup language document delivery system). This computer device serves markup to a requesting browser, which is within a client device.

Appellants respectfully disagree with the Examiner's analysis.

Importantly, the location at which the determining (i.e., identifying or detecting) the operation of content blocking logic takes place (i.e., the computer hardware markup language document delivery system) is different from where content blocking logic resides.

As is well-known to those skilled in the art, a browser within a client device can interact with logic (i.e., a computer program) within the client device. For example, "plug-ins" are a type of commonly-used computer program and provides additional functionality for the browser. These plug-ins could be considered internal to the browser. A firewall is an example of logic that is within a client device and is external to the browser. Content blocking logic, as is known to those skilled in the art, is logic that blocks content to a browser. Within the client device (either internal or external to the browser), the content blocking logic is connected to the browser (so as to prevent certain content from being processed by the browser. Therefore, the operation of the content blocking logic occurs within the client device.

On pages 15 and 16 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner further discussed the teachings of Serena. As noted above, the location at which the determining (i.e., identifying or detecting) the operation of content blocking logic takes place (i.e., the computer hardware markup language document delivery system) is different from where content blocking logic resides. As argued in the Appeal Brief, Gnagy fails to teach the "determining the operation of content blocking logic connected to a browser within a client device" and where this determining is performed (i.e., within a markup language document delivery system).

As admitted by the Examiner (and already acknowledged by Appellants in the Appeal Brief), the observation program 405 performs the operation of content blocking (see last full paragraph on page 16 of the Examiner's Answer). The Examiner is also relying upon the teachings of the observation program 405 (see citations in the fifth full paragraph on page 4 of the Examiner's Answer) to teach the "determining the operation of content blocking logic ..."

However, as claimed, the operation of the content blocking logic is different from where the determining the operation of content blocking logic is performed. Thus, the Examiner's citation of the observation program 405 for both sets of limitations is inconsistent with the claimed language.

Referring to the paragraph spanning pages 16 and 17 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner asserted the following:

In response, Examiner will further clarify the rejection. The claims do not specify how operation of the content blocking logic is determined and while the steps of the claims are in a system, the claims do not specify who in the system is determining the operation. As explained above, Serena teaches of a content blocking logic, i.e. the observation program, connected to a browser within a client device. The observation program may reside on the client device or external to the client device. The observation program does not have to reside in the server as argued by Appellants, Serena teaches that the observation program excutes content preferences and that the content preferences may include content to be blocked. The observation program may perform content blocking based on the content preferences (emphasis added)

Referring to the underlined portion of the above-reproduced passage, Appellants respectfully submit that the Examiner's analysis is misplaced.

The steps of method claim 1 are performed in a markup language document delivery system – also referred to in the art as a "server." Device claim 9 recites that the detection logic is also within a markup language document delivery system (i.e., a server). Therefore, the

functionality of determining of the operation of the content block logic is found within the markup language document delivery system.

Although Serena does not teach that the observation program has to reside in a server, in order for Serena to teach certain of the limitations for which the Examiner is relying upon Serena to teach, the observation program has to reside within the server of Serena. Specifically, as noted above, the Examiner is also relying upon the teachings of the observation program 405 (see citations in the fifth full paragraph on page 4 of the Examiner's Answer) to teaching the "determining the operation of content blocking logic ..." If the Examiner is asserting that the observation program 405 is within the client device or in an intermediary device, then the observation program 405 cannot be relied upon to teach the claimed "determining the operation of content block logic."

Put differently, the limitations that the Examiner is relying upon Screna to teach is (A + B) wherein A = determining the operation of content blocking logic being performed within a markup language document delivery system and B = content blocking logic connected to a browser within a client device. Screna teaches two alternatives (A + not B) and (B + not A), which although separately encompassing the claimed limitations, fails to render obvious the claimed invention, as a whole, which includes (A + B).

The Examiner attempts to cure these deficiencies with the following analysis in the first full paragraph on page 17 of the Examiner's Answer:

As cited in the Office action and acknowledged by the Appellants, the content 24 preferences may be provided by a source other than a user (col. 6, lines 2-5). Serena further 25 describes that he source can be a server and that the preferences of a user on the server is accessed

by the observation program (col. 6, lines 13-16). Thus, the server determines that an observation program, i.e. content block logic, is operating by receiving access from the observation program and by the server providing what content to block to the observation program. As previously explained, the observation program can reside on the client device and is connected to a browser within a client device. Therefore, Serena teaches "content blocking logic connected to a browser within a client device"

The alleged fact that preferences by a user can be sent from a server to an observation program does not establish that the server determines the operation of content blocking logic, as claimed. The sending of preferences does not necessarily result in the operation of content blocking logic. Once the preferences are sent to the observation program from the server. Serena fails to teach that the server follows up and actually determines that the preferences are being implemented. Thus, the Examiner's new analysis fails to cure the above-identified deficiencies in the Examiner's reliance upon the observation program to teaching both determining the operation of content blocking logic being performed within a markup language document delivery system and content blocking logic connected to a browser within a client device

On page 17 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner asserted the following:

In response, it is noted that since the claims recite a "system", the steps of the claims do not have be performed in a single device. Gnagy teaches of a markup language document delivery system that is able to circumvent operation of content blocking logic (col. 7, lines 19-23, 42-48). Thus, a markup language document delivery system is not novel, and it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to implement Serena's teachings into Gnagy's markup language document delivery system.

The Examiner's analysis fails to make a cogent point.

 First, every computer device is a collection of another devices. Thus, whether it is called a computer device or a computer system is not relevant.

Second, the fact that Gnagy teaches that a markup language document delivery system is able to circumvent the operation of content blocking logic fails to either explicitly or inherently establish that Gnagy teaches a determination of the operation of content blocking logic was performed or that this determination was performed in the markup language document delivery system. By analogy, the fact that a lightning rod is positioned on a house does not mean that a determination was performed, within the house, that lightning was in the area. A determination could have been made entirely elsewhere that lightning may eventually be in the area, and as a preventative measure, the light bolt was installed on the house. Similarly, Gnagy does not teach making a determination of the operation of content blocking logic. Instead, Gnagy presumes that content blocking logic (i.e., URL filters – see column 7, lines 59-64 of Gnagy) are being used without actually determining that this content blocking logic is in operation.

Third, the fact that Gnagy teaches a markup language document delivery system (e.g., a server) does not establish where the location of the alleged determination of the operation of content blocking logic is performed.

For the reasons set forth in the Appeal Brief of December 21, 2009, and for those set

forth herein, Appellants respectfully solicit the Honorable Board to reverse the Examiner's

rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is

hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper,

including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-0461, and please credit any excess fees to

such deposit account.

Date: May 17, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

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CUSTOMER NUMBER 46320